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Abstract
WebAssembly (Wasm) is a next-generation portable compi-
lation target for deploying applicationswritten in high-level
languages on the web. In order to protect their memory
from untrusted code, web browser engines confine the exe-
cution of compiled Wasm programs in a memory-safe sand-
box. Unfortunately, classic memory-safety vulnerabilities
(e.g., buffer overflows and use-after-free) can still corrupt
the memory within the sandbox and allow Wasm code to
mount severe attacks. To prevent these attacks, we study
a class of secure compilers that eliminate (different kinds
of) of memory safety violations. Following a rigorous ap-
proach, we discuss memory safety in terms of hypersafety
properties, which let us identify suitable secure compilation
critera for memory-safety-preserving compilers. We conjec-
ture that, barring some restrictions at module boundaries,
the existing security mechanisms of Wasm may suffice to
enforce memory-safety preservation, in the short term. In
the long term, we observe that certain features proposed in
the design of a memory-safe variant of Wasm could allow
compilers to lift these restrictions and enforce relaxed forms
of memory safety.
1 Introduction
WebAssembly (Wasm) has gained traction as the newportable
compilation target language for deploying on the web ap-
plications written in high-level languages like C, C++, and
Rust. Fruit of an unprecedented collaboration between four
major browser vendors, Wasm ensures that even buggy or
malicious code downloaded from untrusted sources can be
executed safely in a web browser [15]. To enforce security,
Wasm programs are validated (type-checked) first and then
executed inside a sandbox that isolates untrusted code from
the browser. Memory safety is key to the isolation mecha-
nism of the sandboxed execution environment: well-typed
programs cannot corrupt the memory outside the sandbox
(e.g., the Javascript virtual machine). Unfortunately, Wasm
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is still far from secure: buffer overflows and use-after-free
can still corrupt the memory of a program within the sand-
box, opening the door to attacks like cross-site scripting
and remote code execution [21]. The presence of memory
vulnerabilities in Wasm thwarts the strenuous efforts de-
voted into securing unsafe languages like C [5, 20, 22, 23, 27]
and developing resource-aware memory-safe languages like
Rust [17, 18]. Current compilers (e.g., Emscripten) do not
attempt to protect compiled programs from Wasm-level at-
tackers exploiting well-known memory vulnerabilities. Fol-
lowing the principled tradition of secure compilation [1, 4,
26], we propose to strengthen the Wasm compilation chain
with a provably secure memory-safety-preserving compiler.
Fortunately, several aspects of Wasm promote rigorous
reasoning and help us in our study. In particular, Wasm (1)
has a (mostly) deterministic formal semantics that rules out
undefined behaviour and (2) is type-safe [15]. The specifica-
tion of Wasm has even been mechanized and verified [29].
Furthermore, the existing security mechanisms of Wasm re-
duce the attack surface available to target level attackers
and thus simplify the job of our secure compiler. Wasm
features structured control-flow and separates code and data
memory segments, which, in combination, enforce coarse-
grained control-flow integrity [2, 3] removing by construc-
tion classic stack-smashing and return-oriented program-
ming attacks. In addition, Wasm provides state and mem-
ory encapsulation through modules, which represent natu-
ral boundaries where to enforce security [15].
Assuming some degree of freedom when setting module
boundaries, we believe that a secure compiler could reuse
the existing mechanisms ofWasm to enforcememory safety
at the target level, in the short term. However, this approach
rests on a strong assumption, namely that the compiler has
direct control over how code gets compartmentalized. As
this may not always be the case, and thus for a long-term so-
lution, we draw inspiration from Memory Safe WebAssem-
bly (MS-Wasm), a recent design proposal for extendingWasm
with hardware-supported progressive memory-safety capa-
bilities [11]. A secure compiler relying onMS-Wasm language-
level support for memory-safety enforcement could allow
looser module boundaries.
In the rest of this short paper, we discuss what notions of
memory safety we wish to enforce and how to formally ex-
press them as (hyper)properties.1 Then, we outlineMS-Wasm
and argue that it is a suitable target candidate for secure
1Properties are defined over single runs of a program, while hyperproper-
ties involve multiple runs [7].
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compilation. Finally, we discuss which secure compilation
criterion to use when preservingmemory safety toMS-Wasm.
2 Memory Safety as a (Hyper)Property
Establishing rigorous security guarantees for our compiler
requires a formal definition of memory safety, an intuitive
notion that has been surprisingly hard to pin down [16].
The exact definition of memory safety has important ram-
ifications for our work because it determines what class of
security properties our compiler has to preserve and thus
what protection mechanisms are needed [4].
Previous works on safe variants of C [5, 20, 22, 23, 27]
treat memory safety as a simple safety property enforce-
able by reference monitors [28] that detect specific memory
violations (e.g., accessing freed memory or an array out-of-
bounds). Seeking a definition that trascends bad behaviours,
Azevedo de Amorim et al. [6] associate memory safety with
reasoning principles about state akin to non-inteferference [14].
Since non-interference relates pairs of executions, their defi-
nition ascribesmemory safety to the class of 2-hypersafety [7],
which is arguably harder to preserve robustly than safety [4,
25].
Here, we consider a notion of memory safety based on
color tags, inspired by a line of work on micro-policies for
tag-based security monitors [8, 10]. Briefly, memory loca-
tions and pointers are tagged with colors and a memory
violation occurs when a pointer accesses memory tagged
with a different color. Unlike the definitions of the works
mentioned above, this safety property is trace-based and ag-
nostic to the specific semantics of the languages involved
and their syntax—the trace only contains memory relevant
actions (i.e., memory allocation, free, read and write). Fur-
thermore, this definition let us study various relaxation of
memory safety that could describe precisely the progressive
guarantees of MS-Wasm, including spatial, (relaxed) tempo-
ral safety2 and pointer integrity, as well as novel properties
that considers only data integrity.3
3 Memory Safe WebAssembly
Memory Safe WebAssembly (MS-Wasm) is an extension of
Wasm designed to capture sufficient metadata about point-
ers andmemory regions to enforcememory safety efficiently,
levereging dedicated hardware. In particular, MS-Wasm pro-
motes a progressive enforcement of memory safety, i.e., de-
pending on application-specific security-performance trade-
offs and what particular hardware is available, the same ab-
stractions can enforce “weaker” forms of memory safety.
The core features of MS-Wasm design are segment memo-
ries, i.e., linearly addressable, zero-initialized, manuallyman-
aged extents ofmemory, and handles, i.e., possibly-corrupted
2Relaxed temporal safety allows memory accesses through dangling point-
ers as long as the memory pointed to has not been reallocated [11].
3To reduce the overhead of enforcing memory-safety, some tools support
modes that check only memory writes [12, 13, 19].
(forged) pointers enriched with bounds metadata. To en-
force memory safety, MS-Wasm restricts the interaction be-
tween segments andmemories appropriately (e.g., only han-
dlers can access segments, provided that they point within
their bounds).
In order to use MS-Wasm as a target language in our se-
cure compilation chain, we have to first formalize its design
and semantics. Then, using variations of our trace-based
definition of memory safety from above, we intend to prove
its progressive memory-safety guarantees involving spatial,
relaxed temporal safety, and pointer integrity, and establish
their relative strengths. With the help of MS-Wasm abstrac-
tions, we are then going to design a class of secure compilers
that preserve clearly-defined notions of memory safety.
4 Secure Compilation to MS-Wasm
To establish the security guarantees of our compilers, we
prove that they attain a secure compilation criterion. Then,
to further clarify their security guarantees, we consider gen-
eral compilation criteria that preserve whole classes of se-
curity properties (including memory-safety), instead of us-
ing an ad-hoc criterion. Given that we can express mem-
ory safety as a safety property as well as a 2-hypersafety
property, we adopt two of the robust compilation criteria
proposed by Abate et al. [4], namely Robust Safety Prop-
erty Preservation (RSP) and Robust 2-Hypersafety Preserva-
tion (R2HSP). Intuitively, these criteria require compilers to
preserve (hyper)properties of source programs even when
they are compiled and linkedwith arbitrary target code, thus
protecting robustly against all active target-level attackers.
In practice, equivalent property-free characterizations sim-
plify significantly the proofs of robust criteria preservation [4].
Specifically, for any compiled program and target context
triggering a bad behaviour, we have to find a corresponding
source-level context that produces the same bad behaviour.
To reconstruct suitable source-level contexts systematically,
we can apply known proof techniques based on backtrans-
lation [4, 9, 24, 25].
The proofs of RSP and R2HSP differ mainly over the kind
of bad behaviours involved, which are determined by the
properties that they preserve (safety and 2-hypersafety). Since
safety is a simple property, bad behaviours are just finite
traces (prefixes) in RSP. In R2HSP, bad behaviours consist
of pair of prefixes because 2-hypersafety is just a general-
ization of safety to a 2-hyperproperty [7]. By including all
memory-relevant actions in our traces, we gain confidence
that the criteria above characterizes correctly the class of
memory-safety-preserving compilers thatwe intend to study.
Memory Safety Preservation for WebAssembly Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
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